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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20000759-CA 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER RAY MARQUEZ, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions for theft, a second degree felony, and 
theft, a third degree felony, both in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 
(2000); burglary of a vehicle, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-6-204 (2000); giving false personal information to a law enforcement 
officer, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-507 
(2000); and interfering with an arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (2000), in the Second Judicial District, Weber County, the 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon, presiding. 
1 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft of a 
motor vehicle where a police officer caught him trying to drive off in a car that had 
been reported stolen less than an hour earlier? 
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, an appellate 
court views '"the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.'" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 
337, 343 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). A 
jury verdict will not be overturned unless the evidence presented at trial is "so 
insufficient that reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict." State v. 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, If 42, 994 P.2d 177. 
2. Where defendant has presented no record evidence showing the possibility 
of a more effective defense, has he demonstrated that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel? 
Where an ineffective assistance claim is raised for the first time on direct 
appeal, this Court decides the issue as a matter of law. State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 
32, Tj 20, 984 P.2d 376; State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). 
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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following applicable statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-204 (2000); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (2000); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (2000); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-507 (2000). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with theft of a motor vehicle, a second 
degree felony; theft of stereo and other equipment, a third degree felony; burglary 
of a vehicle, a class A misdemeanor; giving a false name, birth date, and/or address 
to a law enforcement officer, a class C misdemeanor; and interfering with an arrest, 
a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-5. A jury convicted defendant of all five counts. 
R. 66. He was sentenced to prison terms of one-to-fifteen years and one-to-five 
years on the theft counts. R. 140-143. He was sentenced to jail terms of 365 days 
on the burglary conviction, 90 days on the false name conviction, and 180 days on 
the interfering with an arrest count. Id. The trial judge ordered that all sentences 
run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to the prison term defendant was 
already serving. Id. Defendant timely appealed. R. 144. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 5:00 a.m. on January 23, 2000, Martha Rojas backed her 
station wagon out of her Ogden garage to let it warm up. R. 177:16-18. She left 
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the vehicle, a black 1980 Mercedes with a diesel engine, running in the driveway 
while she went back inside her house to finish getting ready for work. Id. When 
she came out about fifteen minutes later, the car was gone. Id. After checking to 
make sure that it had not rolled down the street, she called the police. Id. at 18. 
At about 5:30 that morning, Ogden resident Brian Runkles left his apartment 
to go to work. Id. at 103. As he neared the apartment's parking lot, he saw 
someone trying to look through the frosted windows of his neighbor's yellow car 
with a flashlight. Id. Brian stepped into the shadows where he then watched the 
man circle a red car. Id. at 104-105. When he heard glass break, he called 911 on 
his cellular phone. Id. 
Brian continued to watch the man at the red car. Brian saw him get out of the 
red car and carry some items to a dark-colored station wagon parked on the west 
side of the parking lot. Id. at 105. Brian couldn't tell what items the thief was 
transferring until he watched the thief get into the trunk of the red vehicle and pull 
out speakers. Id. at 106. About five minutes later, just as the thief started carrying 
his last load from the red car to the dark station wagon, Brian saw a uniformed 
police officer pull up and run into the parking lot. Id. at 29, 106. 
Officer Clint Christensen, the first officer on the scene, saw the thief at the red 
car, a Dodge Shadow, with items in his hand. Id. at 28-29, 41. When the thief 
turned and saw him, Officer Christensen yelled, "Stop where you are, police." Id. 
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at 29. The thief then dropped his load and "took off running," and Officer 
Christensen followed. Id. at 30, 108-109. The thief ran to the black Mercedes 
station wagon, started it up, and tried to drive away. Id. at 30-31. When Officer 
Christensen reached the Mercedes, he kicked through the driver's side window, 
drew his weapon, pointed it at the thief, again identified himself as a police officer, 
and told the thief to show his hands. Id. at 32-34. During this incident, the 
Mercedes lurched forward and then rolled back into the fence. Id. at 33. 
Instead of showing his hands, the thief opened the passenger side door, bolted 
from the car, ran to a nearby chainlink fence, and began to climb over. Id. at 34. 
Officer Christensen ran up, pulled the thief from the fence, and fell to the ground 
with him. Id. They continued struggling until Officer Kevin Cottrell arrived on the 
scene and the two officers together handcuffed the thief. Id. at 34-38. 
Throughout the encounter, from the time he arrived on the scene, Officer 
Christensen never lost sight of the thief. Id. at 64. Officer Christensen identified 
defendant as the thief. Id. at 38-39. Officer Cottrell also identified defendant. Id. 
at 127-128. Inside the Mercedes, the officers found various items taken from the 
red Dodge Shadow. Id. at 39-41. 
Brian Runkles, who had watched the incident unfold, testified that he heard 
the police officer identify himself, saw the thief flee, and witnessed the ensuing 
struggle. Id. at 106, 109-111. He also heard the thief say "he was just trying to 
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catch the guy," but observed no other person in the parking lot. Id. at 114-115. 
Officer Cottrell also testified that defendant told him that "he wasn't the one who 
had broken into the car, he was trying to help the officer catch the suspect and that 
the officer grabbed him instead." Id. at 127. 
After defendant had been subdued, Officer Cottrell checked both defendant 
and Officer Christensen for injuries. Id. at 126. Because defendant was bleeding, 
Officer Cottrell called for medical assistance. An ambulance arrived and 
transported defendant to the hospital. Id. Officer Cottrell followed. Id. 
Officer Cottrell asked defendant to identify himself several times. At the 
crime scene, defendant said his name was Christopher Martinez. Id. at 129. At the 
hospital, defendant said his name was Jose Martinez, his birth date was January 6, 
1986, and he was sixteen years old. Id. at 130. He then changed his birth date to 
January 8, 1979, but continued to say that he was sixteen years old. Id. at 131. At 
the jail station he said his name was Jose Chris Martinez, but jail personnel found a 
booking photo identifying him as Christopher Marquez. Id. at 132. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction for theft of a vehicle is not properly before this court. Defendant did not 
preserve this issue below and does not argue "exceptional circumstances" or "plain 
error" on appeal. Further, defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence 
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supporting the jury's verdict. This Court should therefore decline to review his 
claim. In any case, the evidence amply supports the verdict. Defendant 
misapprehends the law when he argues that circumstantial evidence is insufficient 
to sustain a conviction. 
Defendant has inadequately briefed his claim that trial counsel was ineffective, 
and this Court need not reach it. Further, defendant's claim fails on the merits. 
Defendant has presented no record evidence suggesting that counsel might have 
presented a more effective defense. Nothing in the record suggests what witnesses 
counsel might have called, what evidence he might have moved to suppress, or any 
other additional effort he could or should have made to more effectively represent 
defendant. Further, absent record evidence of what counsel might have done, this 
Court cannot determine whether defendant has suffered any prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT'S INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE CLAIM IS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT; IN ANY EVENT, THE 
EVIDENCE AMPLY SUPPORTS THE VERDICT 
Defendant alleges that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction 
on count I, the theft of Martha Rojas's black Mercedes. Br. Aplt. at 9. He argues 
that "[i]t required jury speculation to find that he was the individual [who] took the 
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automobile," that anyone could have taken the vehicle, and that the State therefore 
did not prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 11. 
Defendant did not preserve this issue below. He does not argue "exceptional 
circumstances" or "plain error" on appeal. The sufficiency issue is therefore not 
properly before this Court. Further, defendant has not properly marshaled the 
evidence in support of the jury's verdict, and this Court need not address it. In any 
event, the evidence amply supports the jury verdict. 
A. Defendant did not preserve his claim below and does not argue 
"exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" on appeal. 
A defendant must raise the sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or 
objection to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 14-17, 
10 P.3d 346. Preservation is required "unless a defendant can demonstrate that 
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Id. at^ f 11. This Court 
may decline to consider an unpreserved issue on appeal where a defendant does not 
argue "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 
1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
Defendant did not preserve his insufficiency claim below. He argues neither 
"exceptional circumstances" nor "plain error" on appeal. This Court should decline 
to review this claim. 
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B. Defendant has not marshaled the evidence supporting the jury verdict. 
Defendant also has not properly marshaled the evidence on this issue. To 
prevail on a claim of insufficient evidence, a defendant must first marshal all the 
evidence that supports the jury's verdict and then show how this marshaled 
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is insufficient to 
support the verdict. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, U 17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108 
(explaining same marshaling requirement for challenging trial court's findings); 
Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal 
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). Marshaling requires the 
defendant to gather all the evidence that supports the verdict and then explain how 
that evidence is not enough to sustain the conviction. See Gamblin, at % 17 n.2. 
"Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume 
the adversary's position," by presenting "in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). After gathering "this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." 
Id. 
Defendant has not fulfilled the marshaling requirement. He has not 
mentioned, for instance, the testimony of key eyewitness Brian Runkles, who 
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watched the parking lot incident unfold. He does not detail Mr. Runkles's 
testimony that defendant made multiple trips carrying items from the red car to the 
black Mercedes. R. 105-106. Neither does he include Mr. Runkles's testimony that 
no one other than defendant was involved, that "no one else was in the parking lot." 
R. 106, 114-115. Further, defendant does little to "demonstrate how [the] evidence, 
even viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support the verdict." 
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994); see also Br. Aplt. at 11. 
Given defendant's failure to marshal the evidence, this Court should simply affirm 
his conviction. 
C. The evidence amply supports defendant's conviction for theft of the 
Mercedes. 
Should this Court excuse Defendant's failure to preserve his claim and his 
failure to marshal the evidence, the evidence was nevertheless more than sufficient 
to support defendant's conviction. Defendant argues that anyone could have taken 
the Mercedes station wagon from Martha Rojas's driveway and driven it to the edge 
of the parking lot. Br. Aplt. at 11. He asserts that "[i]t required jury speculation to 
find that he was the individual who took the vehicle" and that the evidence 
therefore was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Id. In essence, defendant 
argues that without direct evidence that he took the vehicle, the prosecution failed 
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to prove an element of the offense. Defendant misconstrues the requirements of the 
law. 
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, an appellate 
court views "'the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury."' State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 
337, 343 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). A 
jury verdict will not be overturned unless the evidence presented at trial is "so 
insufficient that reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict." State v. 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, t 42, 994 P.2d 177. "When findings of all required elements 
of the crime can be reasonably made from the evidence, including the reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from it, [the Court] stop[s] [its] inquiry and sustain[s] 
the verdict." Id. Further, "[i]t is well-settled in this state that 'a conviction can be 
based on sufficient circumstantial evidence.'" State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 
(Utah App. 1998) (quoting Brown, 948 P.2d at 344). 
Defendant was convicted for theft of the Mercedes. "A person commits theft 
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (2001). 
The circumstantial evidence in this case readily supports reasonable, logical 
inferences that defendant "obtain[ed] or exercise[d] unauthorized control" over the 
Mercedes station wagon "with a purpose to deprive [the owner] thereof." Id. 
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Approximately half an hour after the Mercedes was taken, an eyewitness saw the 
Mercedes at the edge of his parking lot and watched defendant make multiple trips 
to the Mercedes, carrying items he was removing from a red Dodge Shadow. 
R. 177: 103-106. Stolen items from the Dodge Shadow were found in the 
Mercedes. Id. at 40. When defendant sighted Officer Christensen approaching, he 
ran to the Mercedes, started the ignition, and attempted to flee in it. Id. at 30-32. 
This evidence supports the jury's finding that defendant obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the vehicle. The jury could have logically and reasonably 
inferred that defendant had driven the Mercedes to the parking lot and was loading 
it with stolen items that he planned to carry away in it. The jury also could have 
reasonably inferred that defendant either had the keys to the Mercedes or knew he 
had left them in the ignition when, confronted by a police officer, he ran to the 
Mercedes, started it up, and pulled forward, stalling only after the police officer had 
kicked in the driver's side window and reached in. 
In sum, reasonable and logical inferences based on the testimony presented at 
trial amply support defendant's conviction for theft of the Mercedes. 
12 
II. 
DEFENDANT HAS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED HIS CLAIM THAT 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE; IN ANY CASE, HE HAS 
PRESENTED NO RECORD EVIDENCE SUGGESTING THAT TRIAL 
COUNSEL MIGHT HAVE PRESENTED A MORE EFFECTIVE 
DEFENSE 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because "he put on no 
witnesses who would support [defendant's] version that he did not commit the 
theft," because "he failed to move to suppress evidence," and because he "failed to 
provide any defense for [defendant]." Br. Aplt. at 12. Because defendant has 
demonstrated neither deficient performance nor prejudice, he cannot prevail on this 
claim. 
Defendant "bears the burden of establishing that his trial counsel was 
ineffective." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 8, 12 P.3d 92. To succeed on his 
claim, defendant must show both that his counsel "rendered deficient performance 
which fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment" and 
that "counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 
48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Where the claim is 
raised for the first time on direct appeal, this Court decides the issue as a matter of 
law. State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, f 20, 984 P.2d 376; Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50. 
"[Defendant bears the burden of assuring that the record [on an ineffective 
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assistance issue] is adequate." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, % 16. "Where the record 
appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom 
simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." 
Id. atf 17. 
Further, "[i]t is well established that trial tactics and strategies including what 
witnesses to call, what objections to make, and by and large what defenses to put 
forth are within the prerogative of counsel and are generally left to counsel's 
professional judgment." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1993). 
Counsel's decisions about these matters "will not be questioned and viewed as 
ineffectiveness unless there is no reasonable basis for [the] decision[s]." Id. 
A. Defendant has not demonstrated that trial counsel was ineffective because 
"he put on no witnesses who would support [defendant's] version that he 
did not commit the theft." 
Defendant has inadequately briefed this issue, not even indicating what 
witnesses trial counsel should have called. See Br. Aplt. at 12. "The 'mere 
mention' of an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority does not preserve that issue for appeal." State v. Tyree, 2000 UT App 
350, ^ 11, 17 P.3d 587 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Further, defendant has not met his burden to produce a record adequate to 
support his claim that trial counsel should have called witnesses whose testimony 
would have suggested that defendant did not commit the theft. Nothing in the 
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record indicates what witnesses trial counsel might have called. The record, in fact, 
indicates that the State called as witnesses everyone who witnessed the parking lot 
incident except defendant. Defendant did not testify, but nothing in the record 
suggests that defense counsel prevented his testimony or improperly advised him 
not to testify. Defendant has not shown deficient performance. 
Further, he has not shown prejudice. The record does not indicate to what any 
witness, including defendant, might have testified. Absent that, defendant cannot 
show that the testimony would have been helpful or that failure to elicit the 
testimony prejudiced him. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 1994) 
(stating that defendant "must proffer sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result. . . would have 
been different"). 
B. Defendant has not demonstrated that trial counsel was ineffective because 
"he failed to move to suppress evidence." 
Defendant has inadequately briefed this issue, not even indicating what 
evidence might have been suppressed. See Br. Aplt. at 12. Again, "mere mention" 
of an issue does not preserve it for appeal. Tyree, 2000 UT App 350, f^ 11. 
In any event, defendant has not presented a record suggesting that any 
evidence was improperly obtained. "[T]he failure of counsel to make motions or 
objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective 
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assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^ 34, 989 P.2d 52 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Further, absent some showing of what evidence might 
have been suppressed, this Court cannot determine that defendant has been 
prejudiced. 
C. Defendant has not demonstrated that trial counsel was ineffective because 
he "failed to provide any defense for [defendant]." 
Defendant has inadequately briefed this issue. See Br. Aplt. at 12. Again, 
defendant merely alleges that counsel should have "presented some evidence to 
support the Defendant's contention that he did not commit the crimes charged" and 
that, had counsel done so, "the result likely would have been different." Id. 
Defendant does not suggest what evidence might have been presented and points to 
no record support that such evidence was available. As stated, the "mere mention" 
of an issue does not preserve it for appeal. Tyree, 2000 UT App 350, [^J 11. 
Further, where defendant has not indicated what evidence should have been 
presented, this Court cannot determine that he has suffered any prejudice. See 
Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522. 
Finally, trial counsel did present a defense. He vigorously cross-examined the 
State's witnesses and, through their testimony, presented defendant's theory of the 
case. Defendant's theory—that he was trying to catch the thief, not evading arrest, 
when he ran from Officer Christensen and began climbing the chainlink fence—was 
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presented to the jury when Brian Runkles and Officer Cottrell testified to hearing 
defendant say he was trying to help catch the suspect. R. 177:115, 127. 
Defendant's theory was further buttressed when, during cross-examination, trial 
counsel elicited testimony from both officers that they found no tools—screw 
drivers, wrenches, or pliers—at the crime scene. Id. at 55, 135. Finally, in closing 
argument, defense counsel detailed inconsistencies in the testimony that tended to 
incriminate defendant and highlighted testimony consistent with defendant's theory. 
R. 177:149-155. 
Nothing suggests that trial counsel could or should have done more. Trial 
counsel may have made a strategic decision to keep defendant off the stand, 
deciding that defendant could do little more to present this defense and might not 
hold up well under cross-examination. He may even have had information that 
defendant could not present the defense without perjuring himself. Any ambiguities 
and deficiencies in the record on this point must "be construed in favor of a finding 
that counsel performed effectively." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at Tf 17. 
In sum, defendant has presented no evidence from which this Court can find 




Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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76-6-204. Burglary of a vehicle — Charge of other offense. (1) Any person who unlawfully enters 
any vehicle with intent to commit a felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a vehicle. 
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection (1) shall not preclude a charge for a 
commission of any other offense. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76J)7016.ZIP 3,430 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this Title|All Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, July 12, 2001 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_07025.ZIP 3,410 Bytes 
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76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he 
has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or 
detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any act that would 
impede the arrest or detention. 
Amended by Chapter 274, 1990 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_0A019.ZIP 3,769 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this Title[AH Titles[Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, July 12, 2001 
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76-8-507. False personal information to peace officer. A person commits a class C misdemeanor 
if with intent of misleading a peace officer as to his identity, birth date, or place of residence, he 
knowingly gives a false name, birth date, or address to a peace officer in the lawful discharge of his 
official duties. 
Amended by Chapter 97, 1983 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_0A060.ZIP 3,486 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter[Chapters in this TitlejAll TitleslLegislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, July 12, 2001 
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